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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Congress amended section 7803(a) to require the IRS
Commissioner to ensure that IRS employees act in accordance with
statutory rights to taxpayers, thus formally codifying the list in IRS
Publication 1, also known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”). 1
This move signified Congressional intent to balance the IRS’s longstanding goal of efficient tax administration with a new focus on
fairness and transparency, and has also been lauded as a major step
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; HBA, 2014, University of
Toronto. The author would like to thank Professor Tracy Kaye for her abundant guidance and
assistance.
1
Amanda Bartmann, Making Taxpayer Rights Real: Overcoming Challenges to
Integrate Taxpayer Rights into a Tax Agency’s Operations, 69 THE TAX LAWYER 597, 598
(2016).
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forward in pursuing taxpayer compliance. 2 However, there exists a
strong tension between efficiency and fairness. An administration
focused purely on efficiency will naturally seek to streamline
procedures as much as possible, which may leave important interests
such as privacy, confidentiality, appeals, and due process by the
wayside.3
In recent years, the IRS has experienced severe budget cuts that
have gravely impacted its ability to handle tax matters efficiently and
accurately, while still prosecuting tax controversies through due
process.4 As then-IRS Commissioner John Koskinen stepped down
from his position in November 2017, he strongly criticized
Congress’s underfunding of the IRS. 5 The outgoing Commissioner
noted that chronic underfunding has crippled the agency deeply,
highlighting antiquated technology systems and agency
understaffing as particular areas of concern. 6 As Commissioner
Koskinen prepared for his retirement from the agency, he made an
appeal to the public:
Look, 60 percent of our hardware and 22 percent of our
software is out of date . . . We’re down 7,000 revenue
agents . . . Even our most aggressive critics agree that if you
give us money, we’ll get you more money back . . . Every 1
percent drop in compliance costs $33 billion a year. The
amount of money the government loses every day by
underfunding the IRS is already five to eight times the amount

2

Id.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-165, IRS’s FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND 2016
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 29 (“Effective tax administration is the IRS’s core responsibility.
Providing efficient taxpayer services and enforcing the tax laws are the IRS’s primary focuses.
In recent years, the volume and complexity of legislative changes to the Tax Code have been
a challenge. Often, the IRS must implement these legislative changes within limited
timeframes that strain resources and disrupt workload planning.”).
4
See Alan Rappeport, Under Trump, an Already Depleted I.R.S. Could Face Deep Cuts,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/trumpmnuchin-irs.html. See also Michael Grunwald, The IRS is Building a Safe to House Trump’s
Tax Returns, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/
15/john-koskinen-taxes-215830 (noting that the IRS was down to 80,000 employees in 2017
from a peak of 130,000, and that the IRS has lost $900 million in funding since 2010).
5
Joe Davidson, IRS Chief Departs, Blasting Congress for Budget Cuts Threatening Tax
Agency, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2017/11/07/irs-chief-departs-blasting-congress-for-budget-cutsthreatening-tax-agency/.
6
Id.; Grunwald, supra note 4, at 6 (“[If the IRS were to receive more resources,] first,
we’d stop shrinking. We’d upgrade the IT system. We’d provide better service to taxpayers
on the phone. We’d hire more revenue agents and criminal investigators—we don’t need
20,000 more people, but definitely 5,000 or 6,000 more.”).
3
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of money it’s saving on the budget.7
As the IRS continues to suffer further budget cuts, even in the face
of expanded regulatory responsibilities, significant administrative
and security concerns grow evermore exacerbated. Entrusted with
the sensitive financial information of hundreds of millions of
Americans, the IRS must also devote a not insignificant amount of
resources to protecting such information from both domestic and
international threats.
This Note examines how the IRS’s lack of funding has
exacerbated the agency’s struggles to pursue both efficient tax
administration while ensuring that taxpayer rights are respected and
upheld. Part I of this Note summarizes the administrative and
legislative background of the conceptual Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
examining the states of affairs pre and post-2015 codification. Part
II more closely examines the rights to taxpayer privacy and
confidentiality. Part III details IRS tools and activities in which
these rights may be most concerned, and Part IV addresses the IRS’s
current underfunding and how this underfunding significantly
frustrates the IRS’s ability to fulfill its mission.
A. TBOR Overview & Codification in § 7803
The United States tax system is one of voluntary compliance:
individual taxpayers are expected to report and pay their taxes,
subject to potential auditing from the IRS. 8 “Taxpayer charters” are
usually statements enumerating certain basic rights and obligations
that both taxpayers and their respective tax administrations are
expected to adhere to, while in the ordinary course of tax
compliance. 9 Though taxpayer charters have become the norm for
most advanced countries, the United States has lagged significantly
behind in this regard. 10 Its official Taxpayer Bill of Rights was not
issued as IRS Publication 1 until 2014, and remained uncodified until
7

Grunwald, supra note 4, at 5.
Encouraging Voluntary Compliance, IRM 20.1.1.2.1 (Feb. 2, 2011). But see United
States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 840 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The word voluntary is not the
equivalent of optional. To the extent that income taxes are said to be voluntary, they are only
voluntary in that one files the returns and pays the taxes without the IRS first telling each
individual the amount due and then forcing payment . . . .”).
9
OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations – Practice Note, at 3-4, CENTRE FOR TAX
POLICY
AND
ADMINISTRATION
TAX
GUIDANCE
SERIES
(Aug.
2003),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/Taxpayers’_Rights_and_ObligationsPractice_Note.pdf.
10
See generally Keith Fogg & Sime Jozipovic, How can Tax Collection be Structured to
Observe and Preserve Taxpayer Rights: A Discussion of Practices and Possibilities, 69 THE
TAX LAWYER 513, 539-560 (2016).
8
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late 2015 when Congress incorporated it as Section 7803 of the
Internal Revenue Code [“IRC” or “Code”]. 11
Publication 1 and its section 7803 counterpart are not the first
attempts the United States has made to create federal tax charters. 12
A laundry list was previously codified into the Internal Revenue
Code in 1988, 1996, and 1998, although their scattered burial in the
sea of IRC statutory provisions prevented the average layman from
being properly informed of these rights. 13
When the IRS
conspicuously adopted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”) in
2014, issued Publication 1 to all taxpayers, and posted Publication 1
Notices in IRS offices, information about these rights became
drastically more accessible to the average taxpayer. 14 Congress
codified the rights listed in Publication 1 in 2015. 15 In accordance
with the passage of this legislation, the Internal Revenue
Commissioner’s official duties now include ensuring that IRS
employees “are familiar with and act in accord with taxpayer
rights.” 16
According to Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein,
this codification has the potential to achieve more than simply
formalizing these rights; rather, it has several practical effects that
significantly advance the interests of taxpayers. 17 Under traditional
statutory construction principles, “a statute should be construed so
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void, or insignificant.” 18 As such, one
should not interpret the TBOR’s addition to section 7803 as a mere
formality, but as a clear sign of Congress’ intent to expand the
11
The IRS initially released the TBOR as Publication 1. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 98, https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/
2016-ARC/ARC16_Volume1_MSP_05_TBOR.pdf.
12
Your Rights as a Taxpayer: The Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS PUBLICATION 1 REV. 92017, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019); IRC § 7803 (2018).
13
See Omnibus Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (1988)
[hereinafter “TBOR 1”]; Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452
(1996) [hereinafter “TBOR 2”]; Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, Pub. L. No. 105-206, tit. III, 112
Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter “TBOR 3”].
14
Bartmann, supra note 1, at 598 (“Leading up to the IRS’s adoption of the TBOR,
taxpayers’ awareness of their rights was significantly lacking. A 2012 survey conducted for
the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) found fewer than half of U.S. taxpayers believed they
have rights before the IRS, and only 11% said they knew what those rights were.”).
15
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2018). See also Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 401 (2015).
16
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2018).
17
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Embracing the TBOR, 157 TAX NOTES 1281,
1282 (Nov. 27, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2017/157tn1281.pdf.
18
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004).
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breadth of the Commissioner’s duties. 19 Furthermore, section
7803(a)’s inclusion of the TBOR creates a normative basis for
taxpayers to demand legal remedies when their rights are violated. 20
Quoting the Supreme Court, Professors Abreu and Greenstein argue
that the formal enactment of taxpayer rights naturally supports the
taxpayers’ pursuit of legal remedies when their rights are violated. 21
Finally, even though the IRS claims that Publication 1 “takes the
multiple existing rights embedded in the tax code and groups them
into ten broad categories [to make] them more visible and easier for
taxpayers to find,” Abreu and Greenstein argue that codification of
the TBOR may have created new rights for taxpayers. 22 Under the
“contentious view” of the taxpayer-government relationship, where
“even the most benevolent government poses a constant potential
threat to individual liberty,” the government’s duty to act or refrain
from acting in a certain manner may not always or necessarily entail
corresponding enforceable rights for individuals 23
Since the
language of section 7803(a) explicitly imposes an affirmative duty
on tax officials to respect taxpayer rights, taxpayers no longer bear
the burden of showing that these rights create legally binding
obligations on the government. 24
In addition to Abreu and Greenstein’s arguments, it is also
important to note that section 7803(a)’s statutory inclusion of the
TBOR gives taxpayers clearer access to pursuing legal redress under
section 7433. 25 In the past, individuals have been quite unsuccessful
in litigating violations of their rights as taxpayers. 26 Now that the
19

Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1290.
Id. at 1294-95. See also IRC § 7803(a).
21
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The Government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of law, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right.”); Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1295.
22
I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irsadopts-taxpayer-bill-of-rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgov-in-publication-1.
23
Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1299-1300.
24
Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301.
25
I.R.C. § 7433 (2017) (“If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect
to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or
intentionally, or by reason of negligence, disregards any provision of this title, or any
regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages
against the United States . . . .”).
26
This historical lack of success has commonly been associated with failure to comply
with pleading requirements, which can in turn be often attributed to lacking awareness of
taxpayer rights. See generally Guthery v. U.S., 562 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2008); White v.
Comm’r, 899 F. Supp. 767 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that pro se taxpayers’ Section 7433
claims were inadequately pleaded, failing to overcome defense of sovereign immunity).
20
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TBOR has been incorporated into the Code, taxpayers may point
directly to section 7803(a) when alleging such violations; in turn, this
should bring the I.R.S. closer to ensuring that taxpayer rights are
respected.
B. The National Taxpayer Advocate
Despite the TBOR’s incorporation into Publication 1 and its
codification into section 7803, there are still many hurdles to
overcome.
Over the last few years, the National Taxpayer
Advocate’s Annual Report to Congress has repeatedly stressed that
administrative compliance with TBOR continues to straggle, both
with spreading awareness to taxpayers and upholding these
enumerated rights in its ordinary operations. 27 At the same time, the
Taxpayer Advocate Service, known also as the Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate (hereinafter “TAS”), has recognized the position
that “the TBOR is not made up of performance standards itself,” but
rather is “used to develop performance standards and identify which
performance standards may indicate success in furthering the
charter’s principles.” 28
The TAS operates as an independent organization within the IRS
“that helps individual and business payers resolve problems that have
not been resolved through normal IRS channels and addresses largescale, systemic issues that affect groups of taxpayers.” 29 Congress
created the TAS when it passed TBOR 2 in 1996, and further
expanded its role with TBOR 3 in 1998. 30 Today, the TAS operates
local chapters throughout the country, which provide guidance to
individual taxpayers. The TAS department and its chapters operate
under the direction of the National Taxpayer Advocate, who submits
annual reports to Congress, advocating for policy and legislative
changes on behalf of taxpayer interests. 31 Since 2007, Nina Olson,
the incumbent National Taxpayer Advocate, has called for the IRS to
formally adopt, and for Congress to implement, the current iteration
of TBOR into the Code. 32 Following the 2015 codification, the
27
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 99 (2016),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter 2016 REPORT].
28
Id.
29
Bartmann, supra note 1, at 597 n.1.
30
See I.R.C. § 7803(c).
31
I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2).
32
Nina E. Olson, Toward a More Perfect Tax System: A Taxpayer Bill of Rights as a
Framework for Effective Tax Administration, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.
taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-annual-report/downloads/Toward-a-More-Perfect-Tax-
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National Taxpayer Advocate now recommends that the TBOR be
adopted as IRC section 1 to further solidify its status as a
fundamental part of the Code. 33
Although the TAS is technically a part of the IRS, significant
mechanisms exist to protect the TAS from undue influence. An
appointee to the office of National Taxpayer Advocate must not have
worked for any other part of the IRS for at least two years prior to
appointment and may not work for the IRS for another five years
upon leaving the office. 34 Additionally, the TAS has a standing
policy to not disclose taxpayer information to the IRS without due
cause.35 This serves several purposes, enumerated in the Internal
Revenue Manual:
A. To strengthen TAS’s independence and neutrality;
B. To encourage taxpayers to trust and seek help from TAS
without fear of retaliation by other IRS employees;
C. To encourage taxpayers to freely communicate with TAS in
order to resolve their problems; and
D. To calm taxpayers’ fears that information provided to TAS
will be used to the taxpayers’ detriment.36
The TAS is specifically designed for the benefit of taxpayers. The
position’s statutory duties primarily include assisting taxpayers in
resolving disputes with the IRS, conducting research to identify areas
where taxpayer interests have been compromised or require
assistance, and proposing administrative and legislative changes to
the IRS and Congress to benefit taxpayers. 37 The TAS’s role as a
taxpayer ombudsman is further reflected by its only two statutory
qualifications for the National Taxpayer Advocate: “(1) a
background in customer service as well as tax law, and (2) experience
in representing individual taxpayers.” 38
However, TAS’s duty of keeping taxpayer confidences is by no
System-A-Taxpayer-Bill-of-Rights-as-a-Framework-for-Effective-Tax-Administration.pdf.
See also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 284 (2015),
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC
/ARC15_Volume1_LR_Introduction.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Full Report].
33
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE PURPLE BOOK:
COMPILATION OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND
IMPROVE TAX ADMINISTRATION 5-6 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/
Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_PurpleBook.pdf [hereinafter Purple Book].
34
I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(iv).
35
IRM 13.1.5.3(4) (Feb. 2, 2011) (Other Federal Laws or Policies Relevant to TAS’s
Disclosure of Taxpayer’s Information When Working a TAS Case).
36
Id.
37
I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(A).
38
I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(iii).
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means absolute. It is not required to keep confidentiality of
taxpayer’s information from the IRS; instead, this is maintained “at
the taxpayer advocate’s discretion.” 39 While TAS policy generally
favors non-disclosure, this policy is superseded in instances where
the TAS is required to make certain disclosures for standard
procedure, emergencies, or health and safety reasons. 40
Furthermore, TAS employees (as well as any other federal
employee) are required to report criminal or fraudulent violations of
Internal Revenue laws to both the Secretary of the Treasury and the
IRS Commissioner. 41 This duty to report arises after the taxpayer
refuses to cooperate with the TAS in complying with Internal
Revenue laws in a timely manner. 42 It is also important to note that
the TAS’s duty of keeping taxpayer confidences under §7803 applies
primarily to prevent regular disclosures to the IRS. The TAS is still
bound to adhere to requests under the Freedom of Information Act,
subpoenas, and court orders. 43
C. Administrative Deference and Chevron
Under a principle articulated in Zimmerman v. Commissioner in
1978, many practitioners considered the TBOR in Publication 1 to be
merely persuasive and not binding law. 44 Even with statutory
codification, practitioners still debate as to whether this problem has
been fully resolved.
Further, many still wonder as to how the IRS, as an
administrative agency, should be allowed to interpret and enforce
these rights. 45 Generally, administrative law doctrine draws a
distinction between legislative rules, are legally binding, and non legislative or interpretive rules, which have no such effect. 46
39

I.R.C. § 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv).
IRM 13.1.5.4(1) (Feb. 2, 2011).
41
Treas. Reg. §301.7214-1 (1960).
42
IRM 13.1.5.3(3)(C) (Feb. 2, 2011).
43
IRM 13.1.5.5(5) (Feb. 2, 2011); see also I.R.C. § 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv).
44
Zimmerman v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 367, 371 (1978), aff’d 614 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“[a]uthoritative sources of Federal tax law are in the statutes, regulations, and judicial
decisions and not in . . . informal publications [of the IRS].”). Accord Weiss v. Comm’r, 147
T.C. 179, 196 (2016) (“The IRM lacks the force of law and does not create rights for
taxpayers.”); see Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Taxpayer Rights in the United States:
Balancing Taxpayer Protections and Compliance, in THE CONFEDERATION FISCALE
EUROPÉENNE AT 50 YEARS, at 279 (2013).
45
See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006).
46
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499, 516 (2011).
40
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Legislative rules such as United States Treasury regulations are
evaluated under the Chevron two-step test for administrative
deference. For over twenty years following Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the circuits were split over
whether Chevron deference should apply to judicial review of
Treasury regulations.47 In United States v. Mead Corporation, the
Supreme Court held that administrative regulations may be entitled
to either mandatory Chevron deference or the more discretionary
Skidmore deference but did not comment specifically on which level
of deference applied to Treasury regulations. 48 Practitioners called
for more specific clarification, which the Supreme Court provided in
a later 2011 case, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research v. United States. In Mayo, the Supreme Court affirmed that
Treasury regulations, insofar as they are used to promulgate the IRC,
are accorded Chevron deference.49
Under the Chevron doctrine, in a case involving a controversy
over a federal statutory scheme, courts apply a two-step analysis: (1)
if Congressional intent with regard to the matter has been
unambiguously expressed, then this ends the matter; (2) if, however,
Congress has not addressed the issue, then the court “may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by [the agency entrusted with
promulgation of the statute in question].” 50 In its rationale, the
Supreme Court explained that where Congress leaves an explicit
statutory gap or ambiguity, “there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation”; as long as an administrative interpretation is not
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” the
interpretation will control. 51
The IRS Manual distinguishes between legislative and
interpretive rules, stipulating that “[where] Congress simply
provided end result[sic], without any guidance as to how to achieve
the desired goal, then regulations promulgated to achieve that goal
are considered to be legislative,” whereas “[i]f Congress provided
specific rules and merely left gaps for the Secretary to fill,

47

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Hickman, supra note 45, at

1538.
48

U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S., 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011); see e.g.,
Hickman, supra note 45 at 1538.
50
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
51
Id. at 844.
49
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regulations filling those gaps are considered interpretative.” 52
Accordingly, the APA section in the Internal Revenue Manual
(“IRM”) specifically notes: “IRS/Treasury regulations have the force
and effect of law even though they are interpretative regulations.” 53
Unlike legislative statutes or administrative regulations,
however, IRS publications and fact sheets are agency policies, and
are not on their own considered legally-binding.54 Furthermore, the
IRM is considered to be a document that only governs the internal
workings of the IRS, and “does not have the force of law and does
not confer rights upon taxpayers.” 55 When the IRM was first
introduced in 2014, the modern TBOR existed only in an IRS
Publication and the IRM itself, but not in any Treasury Regulation
that would give it legal force and effect. 56 However, after the
TBOR’s was codified into section 7803, the IRS is now bound by
more than its own impetus to uphold taxpayer rights. 57
II. TAXPAYER RIGHTS
A. The Right to Privacy
The IRS has adopted the right to privacy in its formalized
TBOR, stipulating:
Taxpayers have the right to expect that any IRS inquiry,
examination, or enforcement action will comply with the law
and be no more intrusive than necessary, and will respect all
due process rights, including search and seizure protections and
will provide, where applicable, a collection due process
hearing.58
The right of privacy is largely a negative right against the IRS, where
in the event of a tax controversy, taxpayers may expect that the IRS

52

IRM 32.1.1.2.8 (Aug. 21, 2018).
IRM 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (Aug. 21, 2018).
54
STEVE JOHNSON ET AL., CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 25 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 3rd ed.
2016) (“Although the press release calls these rights ‘cornerstone,’ ‘fundamental,’ and
‘important,’ they are matters of administrative policy only and are not judicially
enforceable.”).
55
Fargo v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006).
56
Your Rights as a Taxpayer: The Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS PUBLICATION 1 REV. 92017, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
57
I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2017). See also, Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 401 (2015); Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1290.
58
Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
53
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will not unnecessarily encroach upon their private lives. 59 In a fact
sheet published in 2016, the IRS elaborates further on these limits,
which relate to procedures in both tax collections and disputes,
stating that, with regard to collection, the IRS may not garnish the
entirety of a taxpayer’s wages. 60 Prior to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act (“TCJA”), administrative levies could not collect on an amount
greater than the sum of the standard deduction plus the personal
exemption, or about $10,400; from 2018 onward, this number has
been increased to $12,000 for individuals and $24,000 for married
couples.61 In a similar vein, the IRS must first obtain court approval
before administratively seizing a taxpayer’s personal residence,
through a burdensome showing of “no reasonable alternative to
collection of tax debt.” 62 Section 6334 details extensive restrictions
on the IRS’s ability to impose levies on taxpayers, lending additional
statutory protection. 63
There are also positive aspects to taxpayers’ right to privacy.
For example, taxpayers need not submit additional financial
documentation when applying for an Offer-in-Compromise (“OIC”)
when there is a doubt as to liability. 64 According to Treasury
Regulations, “doubt as to liability exists where there is a genuine
dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax liability under
the law.” 65 In addition, the IRS is usually required to accept an offer
in compromise “when it is unlikely that the tax liability can be
collected in full and the amount offered reasonably reflects collection
potential.” 66
In reading the OIC acceptance requirement in
conjunction with the taxpayer right to privacy, one reaches the
logical conclusion that a taxpayer may seek to settle a disputed tax
liability with the IRS solely on the merits of the settlement offer and
facts surrounding the controversy without the need to submit
additional financial information that might unduly influence the
IRS’s decision to accept the offer. 67 As mentioned above, should the
59

Id. See also Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301.
Id.
61
Id. The personal exemption has since been repealed, and the standard deduction has
been increased accordingly. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 1003 (2017).
62
Id.
63
I.R.C. § 6334.
64
Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
65
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(1) (2002).
66
IRM 5.8.1.2.3 (May 5, 2017).
67
Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy
60
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IRS overstep its bounds and infringe on a taxpayer’s right to privacy
while pursuing a collection action, Section 7433 provides a statutory
vehicle for such taxpayers to pursue civil damages. 68
The right to privacy is ostensibly meant to guarantee taxpayers
assurance that information about their financial situation will not be
intruded upon without due cause; however, the IRS currently remains
far from full compliance with this right. Over the past several years,
Nina Olson’s Annual Congressional Report has detailed various
complications, wherein the IRS’s current administrative practices
fail twofold: (1) taxpayers are not always informed of the rights they
enjoy under TBOR, and (2) IRS employees may sometimes violate
this right to privacy in the interest of expediency, despite their best
intentions. 69
For instance, the IRS uses a mechanism dubbed the “Pre-Refund
Wage Verification Program” to automatically freeze or withhold tax
refunds when it “detects potentially false wages and withholding”
from the taxpayer. 70 Although the program is useful for vetting out
potentially-fraudulent filers and eases the administrative burden on
IRS employees, it is also prone to identifying false positives, which
can result in withholding refunds from legitimate taxpayers; this in
turn requires taxpayers to actively pursue the IRS to obtain their
rightful refunds. 71 To verify that their returns are indeed accurate,
taxpayers may be required to open their books and allow the IRS to
investigate further into their private lives than is normally necessary
for ordinary returns. 72 In response to the TAS’s recommendation that
the IRS take steps to improve the detection of false positives and
perform regular reviews of the program for maintenance, the IRS has
begun implementing regular reviews of the program and its false
detection rate and has pledged to periodically share this information
with the TAS. 73
B. The Right to Confidentiality
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and his
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
68
I.R.C. § 7433 (2018).
69
See e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONG. REP. CARD, at 11,
44, 55-57, 63, 90 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/2015arc_reportcard.pdf [hereinafter
2015 Report Card] (listing various administrative practices that actually or potentially
infringe taxpayers’ rights to privacy).
70
Id. at 11.
71
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 69, at 11.
72
I.R.C, § 7602 (2018).
73
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 69, at 11-12.
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presidency to this point, great controversy has arisen over his refusal
to release his tax returns for public scrutiny, breaking with years of
presidential tradition. 74 Despite the political backlash of this action,
the IRS has consistently upheld President Trump’s right to
confidentiality, refusing to comment on any of his tax affairs 75 In an
interview with Politico Magazine, then-Commissioner John
Koskinen refused to confirm or deny whether the IRS was auditing
the President’s tax returns:
I had no authority to look at anybody’s returns. Nobody can,
unless you’re authorized for the process of examination . . .
Anyone who looks at anyone’s return is subject to termination.
We take this stuff seriously . . . But people need to be confident
in that. Even with our limited resources, we’ll do a million
audits this year.76
The right to confidentiality enjoys substantial statutory
entrenchment: in addition to section 7803’s mandate, section 6103
also directs that taxpayer returns and return information be generally
kept confidential, subject to certain exceptions. 77 Generally, this
means that the IRS may not disclose a taxpayer’s information with
third parties without the taxpayer’s permission, except as otherwise
permitted by law. 78
In addition to mere nondisclosure of taxpayer returns and return
information, IRS employees are also bound from contacting third
parties (such as one’s employer, neighbors, or bank) in connection
with adjustment or collection activities without providing
“reasonable notice in advance” to the taxpayer. 79 According to the
IRS’s fact sheet:
Taxpayers have the right to expect that any information they
provide to the IRS will not be disclosed unless authorized by
the taxpayer or by law. Taxpayers have the right to expect
appropriate action will be taken against employees, return
preparers, and others who wrongfully use or disclose taxpayer

74
Here’s What We Do and Do Not Know About President Trump’s Tax Returns, USA
TODAY (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:44 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/
2017/03/14/heres-what-we-know-about-trumps-tax-returns/99192032/.
75
Grunwald, supra note 4.
76
Grunwald, supra note 4.
77
See I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7803 (2018).
78
Taxpayer Bill of Rights: #8, The Right to Confidentiality, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-rightto-confidentiality.
79
Id.
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return information.80
Like the right to privacy, the right to confidentiality is a negative
right, imposing an affirmative duty upon the IRS to perform in such
a manner that does not violate the taxpayer’s rights.81 Section
6103(a) provides an extensive list of parties whose actions are
restricted, including federal employees and officers, state employees
and officers, government contractors, and other various persons with
access to taxpayer return information. 82
Under section 6103, the right to confidentiality in this context
does not prohibit the IRS from sharing taxpayer return information,
as needed, with other parts of the government: state tax agencies may
submit requests in writing for their own tax administration purposes;
law enforcement agencies may request information when
investigating and prosecuting non-tax criminal laws; and other
federal employees may request where required to discharge their
duties.83 The IRS is also permitted to disclose to the taxpayer’s
designated legal representative or other individuals with power of
attorney or guardianship. 84 Persons with material interests in the
taxpayer’s return information may also submit written requests for
disclosure from the IRS: in the case of an individual, the taxpayer’s
spouse or children when filing jointly; in the case of a partnership,
members of the partnership at the time of the return; and in the case
of a corporation, designees of the board of directors, principal
officers, and/or significant shareholders. 85
Even under the right to confidentiality, the list of persons and
organizations to whom the IRS may permissibly disclose an
individual’s tax return information is extensive. Since most of these
exceptions require a militating cause in order to request information,
most law-abiding taxpayers need not fret. However, high-profile
individuals and large corporations may be more concerned about
information leaks or impermissible disclosures, such as where tax
preparers or others with access may lack the proper security
precautions or even have incentive to disclose sensitive
information. 86
80

Id.
See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301.
82
I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2018).
83
I.R.C. § 6103 (2018); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6103(f) (pertaining to Congressional
Committees), 6103(g) (pertaining to POTUS and other executive employees), 6103(h) (2018)
(pertaining to Departments of the Treasury and Justice).
84
I.R.C. § 6103(c), 6103(e)(2), 6103(e)(6) (2018).
85
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1) (2018).
86
See, e.g., Gregg Birnbaum, Who is Leaking Donald Trump’s Tax Returns?, NBC NEWS
81
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Section 7216 stipulates criminal penalties for tax professional
who prepare tax returns that violate section 6103’s requirements: a
misdemeanor conviction, accompanied by a fine of up to $1,000 and/
or a prison sentence of one year. 87 Section 7213 holds much heavier
penalties for government employees, to can be subjected to automatic
termination, as well as a $5,000 fine and/or a five-year prison
sentence for a single unauthorized disclosure. 88 In addition to
criminal penalties, section 7431 specifies that such violators may
also be liable for hefty civil damages to compromised taxpayers. 89
III. PURSUING TAX ADMINISTRATION EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE
Although the TBOR applies in many different circumstances,
many taxpayers are likely familiar with deficiency assessments and
collection actions. In addition to the taxpayers’ rights to “challenge
the IRS’s position” and to “a fair and just tax system,” taxpayers’
rights to privacy and confidentiality may also be implicated when
they seek to appeal inaccurate assessments, remedy tax liens, or
reach alternative arrangements such as payment plans or settlement
offers.
A. Administrative Tools: Federal Tax Liens and Levies
After the IRS has assessed a tax deficiency and delivered a
notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, a federal tax lien is the IRS’s
usual first exercise of collecting power in response to non-payment.90
The IRS uses three methods to enforce a federal tax lien: (1)
administrative wage levy, (2) administrative property seizure, and (3)
judicial collection. 91 Though the IRS may seek collection through
suit even without creating the lien, the lien is usually preferred for
its administrative expediency. 92
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/who-leaking-donald-trump-s-taxreturns-n733661 (examining the circumstances around the March 14, 2017, leak of President
Trump’s 2005 tax return).
87
I.R.C. § 7216(a)(2) (2018).
88
I.R.C. § 7213(a) (2018).
89
I.R.C. § 7431 (2018).
90
I.R.C. § 6321 (2018). See also Mather & Weisman, Federal Tax Collection Procedure
– Liens, Levies, Suits, and Third Party Liability, 637-2nd T.M., § I: Introduction (Bloomberg
Law).
91
I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331.
92
U.S. v. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry., 249 F. 678, 685 (6th Cir. 1918)
(“[W]here a tax of a fixed percentage is imposed by statute [and its amount or value] can be
ascertained and determined, on evidence, by a court, a suit for the tax will lie [with the
government], without an assessment.”).
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Typically, “the Government may collect taxes of a delinquent
taxpayer ‘by levy upon all property and rights to property . . .
belonging to such person.” 93 After property has been levied, any
person in possession of such encumbered property must surrender it
to the IRS. 94 If, however, the IRS assesses a liability as “fully
satisfied” or “legally unenforceable,” Section 6325 requires related
property liens to be released within thirty days. 95 Although the IRS
has a wide array of tools available to enforce its collection duties, it
must adhere to Collection Due Process and must offer alternative
arrangements, such as Offers-in-Compromise, for taxpayers with
unique situations. 96
i. Restriction on Administrative Tools: Collection Due
Process (CDP)
The concept of Collection Due Process (CDP) was created in
1998 to provide taxpayers with the right to appeal lien and levy
actions from the IRS. 97 According to National Taxpayer Advocate’s
Annual Congressional Report, “Congress intended the IRS to provide
meaningful Collection Due Process (CDP) hearings to taxpayers,
weighing their concerns that any collection action be no more
intrusive than necessary against the government’s need for the
efficient collection of taxes.” 98 Since this balancing test forms the
heart of a CDP hearing, TAS has consequently called upon the IRS
to adopt a formal policy statement on this CDP balancing test in
accordance with congressional intent. 99
Generally under CDP principles, the IRS must serve a formal
93

United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985) (quoting I.R.C. §
6331(a)).
94
Id. See also I.R.C. § 6332(a).
95
I.R.C. § 6325(a).
96
Should the IRS negligently or knowingly fail to provide proper notice or timely
release these liens, taxpayers may seek compensatory damages through section 7432 ;
I.R.C. § 7432 (1988). However, taxpayers have been largely unsuccessful in seeking relief
under this provision, often due to their failure to first fully exhaust administrative remedies or
because the courts have interpreted fairly wide latitude. See e.g., Hook v. U.S., 624 Fed.
Appx. 972 (10th Cir. 2015) (dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Clark
v. United States, 462 Fed. Appx. 719 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); Don Johnson Motors, Inc. v. U.S., 453 Fed. Appx. 526 (5th Cir.
2011) (finding that the IRS properly issued notices of intent to levy and tax lien and taxpayer
failed to exhaust remedies).
97
Collection Due Process, PHILIP C. COOK LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINIC,
http://taxclinic.law.gsu.edu/collections-process/collection-due-process/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
98
2015 Full Report, supra note 32 at 93.
99
2015 Full Report, supra note 32 at 93-94.
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notice of a federal tax lien filing on the taxpayer within five business
days of filing, pursuant to Section 6320. 100 This notice must be
served in a concrete manner which is either in person, left at the
taxpayer’s dwelling or usual place of business, or sent by certified
mail. This notice must also detail the taxpayer’s amount of unpaid
tax, the taxpayer’s right to request an administrative hearing, the
process for administratively appealing the lien, and the procedures
for curing the lien. 101
Similar to the federal tax lien, a property levy is also a powerful
and convenient administrative tool that removes the onus of seeking
payment from the IRS and transfers the burden upon the delinquent
taxpayer to seek redress. 102 To prevent abuse of property levy, the
Code imposes notice requirements before it may be used.103
Generally, a formal notice of intent to levy must be served on the
delinquent taxpayer at least thirty days before a taxpayer’s wages or
property are levied, and it must include detailed information as to the
levy process, availability of administrative appeals, and methods of
curing the levy. 104
Interestingly, despite the taxpayer’s innate interest in privacy, it
sometimes to one’s benefit to disclose one’s financial condition to
the IRS. Following a 2009 Tax Court decision, the IRS is now
required to release levies upon determining that such levies would
cause a taxpayer undue economic hardship (a point discussed further
below), regardless of whether the taxpayer was current on his/her tax
returns.105 Both tax practitioners and the TAS hailed this as a major
win for taxpayers. TAS then worked with the IRS to revise the Pre Levy Considerations section of the IRM to ensure that taxpayers
receive their rights to a fair and just tax system. 106 The IRM now
specifically requires that IRS employees consider several factors
100

Collection Due Process (CDP) FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/appeals/collection-due-process-cdp-faqs (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
101
I.R.C. § 6320(a) (2018). See also I.R.C. § 6326 (2018).
102
I.R.C. § 6331 (2018).
103
I.R.C. § 6331(d) (2018).
104
I.R.C. § 6331(d)(2) (2018). See also I.R.C. § 6331(d)(3) (2018) (removing notice
requirements where the Treasury Secretary finds that collection of tax is in jeopardy).
105
Vinatieri v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 392, 401-02 (2009) (agreeing with IRS finding of
economic hardship where petitioner’s medical condition imposed significant expenses and
permitted only part-time employment, and petitioner’s assets totaled less than $1000). See
also I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D). But see Link v. Comm’r, 2013 WL 608396, at *5 (2013)
(distinguishing Vinatieri and refusing to release levy where reasonable IRS determination
disagreed with petitioner’s economic hardship claim).
106
Bartmann, supra note 1, at 619-20.
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before implementing a property levy on taxpayers, including whether
such a levy would cause economic hardship due to the taxpayer’s
known financial condition, the taxpayer’s responsiveness to attempts
at contact and collection, the taxpayer’s compliance history, and the
taxpayer’s current status and efforts in paying current taxes. 107 An
additional note in the Manual further instructs employees to refrain
from issuing levies as a way to secure other compliance, such as
filing missing tax returns, when the Service determines that the levy
would cause economic hardship. 108
Once the IRS has imposed a property levy, the taxpayer
generally may not appeal the amount of unpaid tax due without
submitting new information that was not previously considered in the
initial audit. 109 Instead, the taxpayer must either file for a refund
(after paying the amount due to cure the assessed deficiency) or file
an “Offer-in-Compromise, Doubt as to Liability.” 110 The claim for
refund begins the administrative review process anew; if the IRS
determines that the levy was wrongfully made, it will either return
the levied property or the sum of money received in initial
satisfaction of the levy. 111 On the other hand, a pending OIC will
forestall the IRS from placing future levies with respect to the
liability in question, though it will not prevent potential interest and
penalties from accruing. 112 In the event that the IRS rejects a
taxpayer’s OIC, the IRS will further refrain from levying against the
taxpayer’s property for thirty days following rejection, as well as for
the period in which an administrative appeal of the rejection is
considered. 113
The TAS has also noted that “[t]he balancing test also validates
the taxpayer’s right to privacy by taking into account the
invasiveness of enforcement actions and the due process rights of the
taxpayer.” 114 Upon review of the IRS’s CDP procedures and
examination of case law, the TAS found that the IRS Office of
Appeals failed to properly account for the CDP balancing test,
especially with regard to legitimate taxpayer concerns about the
107

IRM 5.11.1.3.1(2) (Nov. 9, 2011).
Id.
109
Collection Due Process (CDP) FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/appeals/collection-due-process-cdp-faqs (last visited Nov.
10, 2017).
110
Id.
111
See I.R.C. § 6343 (2018).
112
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(g)(1) (2002).
113
Id.
114
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93.
108
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intrusiveness of the proposed collection action. 115 As a result, the
TAS concluded that “lack of detailed and specific procedures
describing how to conduct the balancing test, along with inadequate
training on how to apply such a test, undermines the congressional
intent to enhance taxpayer protections through CDP hearings, and
erodes core taxpayer rights.” 116
B. Administrative Alternatives to Liens, Levies, and Tax Litigation
i. Offers-in-Compromise (“OIC”)
The OIC program exists as an alternative method of satisfying
an unpaid tax liability, particularly where the taxpayer’s financial
circumstances may be difficult to gauge or calculate with substantial
accuracy. 117 Under section 7122, the Treasury Department, and by
extension, the IRS, may accept either lump-sum or periodic payment
offers-in-compromise as satisfaction of either civil or criminal
liability arising from internal revenue laws. 118 Before submitting an
offer, a taxpayer must first have filed all legally required tax returns,
as well as remained up to date on required estimated tax payments
for the current tax year. 119
According to the Internal Revenue Manual, “[t]he [IRS] will
accept an offer in compromise when it is unlikely that the tax liability
can be collected in full and the amount offered reasonably reflects
collection potential.” 120 Furthermore, “no offer to compromise may
be rejected solely on the basis of the amount of the offer without
(first) evaluating that offer,” nor may the IRS “reject an offer-incompromise from a low-income taxpayer solely on the basis of the
amount of the offer.” 121 In submitting an offer to the IRS, the
taxpayer must make the request “in writing . . . under penalty of
perjury, and must [include] all of the information prescribed or
requested. . . .”122 Furthermore, a taxpayer must attach at least

115

NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93.
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93.
117
I.R.C. § 7122 (2018).
118
I.R.C. § 7122 (2018).
119
Form 656-B Offer in Compromise, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656b.pdf (last visited April 1, 2019).
120
IRM 1.2.14.1.17 (Jan. 30, 1992) (emphasis in original). But see Fargo v. Comm’r, 447
F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven if the Manual does recommend negotiation, it contains
numerous provisions that vest Appeals Officers with the discretion to accept or reject offersin-compromise.”).
121
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(3) (2002); I.R.C. § 7122(d)(3)(A).
122
Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(d)(1) (2002).
116
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twenty percent of the proffered lump sum settlement or an entire
monthly payment, and continue to make regular monthly payments
while the OIC is under consideration.123 Once the IRS accepts an
OIC, the taxpayer is required to continue to timely file, and to pay
all required tax returns and estimated tax payments for five years. 124
Should the taxpayer fail to do so, the IRS considers the OIC to be in
default and reinstates the original tax liability with accrued interest
and penalties, less payments made. 125
Generally, there are three broad rationales by which a taxpayerofferor may seek to offer settlement of tax liability under the OIC:
(1) doubt as to liability (DATL), (2) doubt as to collectibility
(DATC), and (3) promotion of effective tax administration. 126
As discussed in Part II(A), DATL requires the IRS to find “a
genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax
liability under the law.” 127 Here, the right to privacy limits the issue
solely to the taxpayer’s liability rather than the taxpayer’s ability to
pay, which under collectability is a separate issue.
Under a DATC rationale a taxpayer’s OIC can succeed by
showing that “the taxpayer’s assets and income are less than the full
amount of the liability.” 128 Since the taxpayer must demonstrate a
financial inability to pay, this inherently requires at least a partial
concession of the taxpayer’s right to privacy; nonetheless, the IRS
may not unreasonably probe further into the taxpayer’s affairs. The
IRS may pierce this right to privacy when there is reason to suspect
taxpayer misrepresentation, or a frivolous submission that would
impact the acceptance of the OIC. 129
Finally, a successful OIC “based on promotion of effective tax
administration” is dependent on whether “collection of the full
liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship.” 130 The
Treasury Regulations define economic hardship as circumstances in
which full or partial satisfaction of the liability would “cause an
individual taxpayer to be unable to pay his or her reasonable basic
123

Form 656-B Offer in Compromise, supra note 120, at 3.
Id. at 6.
125
Id.
126
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 (2019); see also IRS, Taxpayer Bill of Rights #10: The
Right to a Fair and Just Tax System, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2015-18 (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-number-10-the-right-to-a-fair-andjust-tax-system.
127
26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 (b)(1) (2019).
128
26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2019).
129
See I.R.C. § 7122(g) (2018); see also I.R.C. § 6702(b)(2)(A) (2018).
130
26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i) (2019).
124
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living expenses.” 131
“Reasonable basic living expenses” are
determined on a case-by-case basis depending on relevant facts the
taxpayer supplied, such as ability to earn, number of dependents,
food, clothing, housing, transportation, medical expenses, and local
cost of living. 132 As with DATC, the taxpayer must also submit an
effective tax administration or economic hardship OIC and its
supplementary information in good faith; falsification of financial
information, inflation of expenses or costs, or any other form of
material misrepresentation will cause the IRS to reject the OIC. 133
Under these statutory rules and administrative policies regarding
OIC, the circumstances in which the IRS may reject offers are likely
those where misrepresentation occurs, where the IRS deems that the
taxpayer is indeed liable for and able to pay the amount in
controversy without economic hardship, and where the IRS deems
the offer to be inadequate according to prescribed guidelines. 134
In furthering the IRS’s interest in taxpayer compliance and
efficient tax collection, the OIC fundamentally exists as an expedient
administrative tool to resolve matters through negotiation and
compromise, where fully litigating a tax controversy would be
burdensome for both sides. 135 The OIC program exists primarily to
“effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the earliest
possible time and at the least cost to the Government” and to
“provide the taxpayer a fresh start toward future voluntary
compliance with all filing and payment requirements.” 136
Inasmuch as the OIC application involves direct communication
between Service collection specialists and the taxpayers or their
representatives, the taxpayer’s rights to both privacy and
confidentiality are once again implicated. 137 There are several
important reasons why taxpayers seeking to settle their tax liabilities
may prefer to pursue an OIC: 1) the offer process requires taxpayers
to confront and examine their personal finances and tax reporting
history; and 2) favorable outcomes may alter taxpayer perceptions in
favor of the Service, “not as a villain or a leviathan but as an agency
committed to service and support.” 138
131

Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(i) (1994).
Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii) (1994).
133
Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(iii) (1994).
134
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f) (2002); I.R.C. § 7122(d)(1).
135
See IRM 5.8.1 (Aug. 1, 2017). See also I.R.C. § 7122.
136
IRM 5.8.1.2.4 (Sept. 23, 2008).
137
Joseph C. Dugan, Compromising Compliance? The Service Offer in Compromise
Program and Opportunities for Reform, 70 TAX LAW 609, 612-13 (2017).
138
Id.
132
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE IRS
As discussed earlier, both former IRS Commissioner Koskinen
and incumbent National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson have agreed
on the fact that the IRS returns significantly more money in revenue
than it takes from its allotted budget. By way of numbers, the IRS
collected $2.86 trillion on a budget of $11.2 billion in Fiscal Year
2013, amounting to an average ROI of about 255:1. 139 In Fiscal Year
2017, the IRS collected $3.4 trillion on a budget of $12.71 billion. 140
Of these staggering amounts of collected revenue, the TAS estimates
that ninety-eight percent comes from timely and voluntary taxpayer
compliance, and a mere two percent is derived from IRS enforcement
actions.141 Although enforcement actions are important to ensure
continued future compliance, they remain grossly inefficient from a
purely financial perspective.
A. Five Years of Budget Cuts
Despite the IRS’s vital mission, however, it has not received the
corresponding support required from Congress. According to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the IRS’s 2018 enforcement
budget was approximately 23% less than in 2010, after adjusting for
inflation. 142 In 2017, the IRS audited only 1 in 161 individual tax
returns, down from 1 in 90 in 2011; likewise the IRS audited only 1
in 101 corporate returns in 2017, down from 1 in 61 in 2012. 143
Commissioner Koskinen estimates that the IRS’s inability to conduct
its proper auditing activities costs the government approximately $6
billion in uncollected revenue each year. 144 Furthermore, the IRS’s
outdated tech systems, some “still running some applications from
when JFK was president,” present additional logistical and security
concerns that hinder the IRS’s ability to efficiently fulfill its
139
NAT’L
TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE
2013
ANN.
REP.
TO
CONG.
21,
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/IRS-BUDGET-The-IRSDesperately-Needs-More-Funding-to-Serve-Taxpayers-and-Increase-VoluntaryCompliance.pdf. See also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165, IRS’S FISCAL
YEARS 2013 AND 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS at 76 (2018).
140
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165 at 57, IRS’S FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND
2016 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 57 (2018).
141
Hearing on IRS FY 2016 Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen.
Gov’t Comm. on Approps., 114th Cong. 1-2, (2015) (statement of Nina E. Olson, Nat’l
Taxpayer Advocate).
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mission.145
In her 2017 Congressional Report, Nina Olson noted that
underfunding has directly resulted in a situation where “shortcuts
have become the norm, and shortcuts are incompatible with highquality tax administration.” 146 Olson also reiterated the call to
provide the IRS with more funding, noting that the 2017 tax reform
bill would place even more strain on an overexerted system already
struggling to balance administrative efficiency, promotion of
taxpayer compliance, and protection of taxpayer rights. 147
In response to regular annual budget cuts of nearly twentypercent from fiscal years 2010 to 2016, the IRS has implemented a
“Future State Plan,” shifting much of its in-person and telephone
taxpayer services to online channels and self-service.148 The IRS
Office of Appeals has adopted a policy where most tax appeal
conferences are conducted by telephone instead of face-to-face.149
The TAS has noted that this may damage the taxpayer’s assurance of
the right to confidentiality; where multiple participants phone into an
appeals conference, the risk of unauthorized disclosure rises
steeply.150 However, the IRS has a strong budget-conscious reason
for shifting channels from in-person to phones, and from phones to
online services: in 2013, the average customer call to a call center
may have cost $7.50, whereas the same call to an automated
interactive voice response system would cost only $0.32. 151
Taxpayers “feel more at ease when speaking with local
representatives who fully understand their language and idiomatic
expressions.” 152 However, the Future State Plan drastically inhibits
the ability for taxpayers to seek in-person communications. 153 The
TAS reports that in instances where telephone or in-person
conferences are the preferred method of communication, taxpayers
145

Grunwald, supra note 4.
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2017 ANN. REP. TO CONG.
vii,
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter “2017 Report”].
147
Id.
148
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 64-65,
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter “2016 Report”].
149
See IRM 8.6.1.4.1 (Oct. 1, 2016).
150
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149 at 106.
151
Daniela Yu & John H. Fleming, How Customers Interact with Their Banks, GALLUP
(May 7, 2013), http://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/162107/customers-interactbanks.aspx?version=print.
152
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 92.
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NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 66.
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“may feel alienated, frustrated, and disengaged from the tax system,”
which may cause them to make emotional spur-of-the-moment
decisions that they later regret. 154 However, according to the
Government Accountability Office’s most recent IRS report, online
services are increasingly becoming taxpayers’ preferred medium of
interaction with the agency. 155 This represents an important
opportunity for the IRS to begin re-expanding its availability and
services to taxpayers while operating on a razor-thin budget.
The IRS also began implementing an increasing number of user
fees for various services, such as entrance into installment
agreements, offers-in-compromise, and private letter rulings. 156 As
discussed above, installment agreements and OICs are exercises in
taxpayers’ rights to privacy, confidentiality, and a fair and just tax
system; accordingly, the TAS has asserted that imposition of the
slightest fees on such services infringes on these rights, and has
called on Congress to prohibit such practices. 157 While the TAS
makes a compelling argument that the IRS may well have
overstepped its bounds in requiring taxpayers to pay fees for merely
exercising their rights, there is nonetheless a compelling
countervailing justification that the IRS might present: these fees are
meant to offset associated costs, and to prevent excessive
administrative burdens on the IRS by having requesting taxpayers
internalize some of the costs. 158 Nonetheless, irrespective of whether
such fees are justified, their very imposition reflects the Service’s
desperate state and its need for more funding and resources.
V. CONCLUSION
According to the TAS, the prevailing purpose of tax
administration is to “enable voluntary compliance which can be
achieved by providing services, creating a culture of trust, and
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 66.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165, IRS’S FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND
2016 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS at 29 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689341.pdf;
Grunwald, supra note 4 (quoting Commissioner Koskinen: “Now look, we’ve moved more
processing online, and we’ve gotten even more efficient . . . [w]e still maintain a huge
technology system that processes over 200 million returns a year . . . [a]nd we have to answer
the phone when people call. When the budget gets cut, everything suffers.”).
156
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 147, at 307-08.
157
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 147, at 307-08.
158
This is scarcely an isolated situation where fees might be permissibly imposed on
exercising legal rights; after all, citizens must pay court fees when seeking judicial remedies.
It stands to reason, however, that overly burdensome fees might indeed impermissibly
discourage citizens from properly exercising their rights; the solution likely lies somewhere
in between balancing these interests.
154
155
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promoting an understanding of the role taxes play in a civilized
society.” 159 Woefully crippled by budget cuts, while the IRS has
taken admirable steps toward this goal, it remains a servant beholden
to many masters: taxpayers’ rights, efficient tax collection, and
enforcement.
Some have opined that “such a system requires more than the
plain statement of rights. Only a system based on actions that follow
the defined policy goals can achieve the necessary fairness
considerations.” 160 The relatively new introduction of a slew of
procedural rights, now codified in law and given legally binding
power, has perhaps exacerbated the difficulty of heavy agency
budget cuts to the point where some professionals have hypothesized
as “what may be taxpayer rights in the eyes of some are procedural
burdens in the eye of the tax administrator.” 161 The IRS must
therefore continue to pursue measures in voluntary compliance if it
is to succeed in fulfilling its multiple (and sometimes divergent)
responsibilities.
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2016 Report, supra note 149, at 102.
Fogg & Jozipovic, supra note 10, at 564.
Mazza & Kaye, supra note 44, at 297.

